完善个人所得税制加大立法和征管力度

我国目前个人所得税制在分类课税模式、费用扣除标准、税率结构、税收征管等方面存在很多问题,及时完善个人所得税制,提高征管水平,使其更加规范并符合国际惯例,这是我国市场经济发展的必然趋。     

资源禀赋说,“入世”的悖论——兼与林毅夫教授商榷

本文从政策与法律的关系角度揭示了农村税费改革从党的政策形态向法治形态演进的规律 ,同时 ,进一步从税收的本质特征方面论证了农村税费改革的前途必定是农村税收法定。     

资源税和补偿费理论辨析

本文从对土地的剩余征税说起,准确地分析了地租和土地税的征收主体、征收对象、征收依据、征收目的.进而把土地与矿产作类比,深入浅出地说明了由于资源(土地、矿产)所有者不同,决定的地租(矿租)和土地税(矿产税)的征收主体、征收对象、征收依据、征收目的存在与否及其差异.明确指出资源税没有立税的理论依据,补偿费理论解释存在错误,建议取消资源税和现在的补偿费,设立权利金制度.     

Property taxation in Israel: a non ad valorem approach

The arnona, the system of property taxation in Israel, is a unique form of taxation being based on a property's size (m²) and not on its discrete open market value. The actual use of the property (residential versus non-residential), its location in the municipality, type of property and its age are the determining factors for tax liability. In order to test for equity within the current system, the methodology adopted was to investigate the effect of population size, remoteness and population makeup with respect to some 80 municipalities on the levels of arnona. Although the thresholds of arnona for individual municipalities are approved by a committee of the Knesset, the present analysis indicates that the current differences in per capita amount of arnona collected by local authorities do reflect factors that would normally be expected to influence an ad valorem property tax in a market economy. It is argued that whilst the arnona is an accepted form of local authority property taxation, there are a number of fundamental weaknesses. Its application could be improved by incorporating elements of an ad valorem property tax, which would more fully reflect the socio-economic level of taxpayers and the physical condition of the built environment. However, the arnona, not being based directly on a property's market value should be of interest to countries (e.g. transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe) who are presently introducing property taxes within an environment where property markets are not as yet fully developed.     

从企业筹资方式选择看我国融资制度建设

企业融资与现代经济已完全融为一体。应该综合利用我们的现有资源和有益经验,积极借鉴国外成功做法,辨证、客观、全面地比较、选择直接融资与间接融资。     

An Efficiency Analysis of Consumption and Production Taxation with an Application to Value-Added Taxation

The usual arguments pro destination-based, consumption-oriented or pro origin-based, production-oriented VAT are found wanting. They largely ignore tax effects on locational choices of firms. This paper provides a comparison of consumption and production taxation within a model of firm and household mobility. It is shown that the case for consumption taxation becomes stronger when profit taxes are not available. The consumption tax is the more targeted instrument when households are to be induced to locate efficiently. It is argued that, with border controls lacking, the alternative option should be seen more in a wage tax and less in a production tax.     

Energy Tax and Competition in Energy Efficiency: The Case of Consumer Durables

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of anenergy tax on technical improvements and on prices ofconsumer durables induced by strategic competition inenergy efficiency. If the gasoline tax is raised thisdoes in principle not affect the producers of carsbecause the motorist pays for it in terms of a highercost of using the car. This, however, affects the unitsales of car producers because of substitution towardsother modes of transportation. A second element ofreaction to energy price variation is an indirect oneand relates to the effect of energy prices ontechnology. Competition forces car producers todevelop more energy efficient cars in order to reducethe cost of using a car. This indirect effect canpartly offset the direct effect of higher energyprices on demand if it is profitable for theautomobile industry to engineer more energy efficientequipment. We will analyze the impact of an energy taxon energy efficiency and on the price of a durablegood. This will be done within the framework of aduopoly competing in prices and in the energyefficiency of its products. The government chooses awelfare maximizing energy tax as an incentive toinnovate. Then we will analyze a strategic two-stagedecision process in which the duopolists first decideabout energy efficiency and then compete in prices.     

The impact of tax reforms on unemployment in a SMOPEC

This paper analyzes revenue-neutral tax reforms for a small open economy which is constrained to a balanced current account and whose producers have market power on the world market. We consider origin-based and destination-based commodity taxes as well as taxes on income, the payroll, and on an imported factor of production. Our main findings are the following. First, the strength, and for some parameter constellations, even the sign of the employment effect of tax reforms varies with the degree of openness of the economy. Second, the indeterminacy of the sign of the employment effect crucially hinges on the presence of an internationally mobile factor. The central mechanism underlying our results are adjustments of the real exchange rate which have repercussions on wage and price setting and therefore on employment.     

Optimal International Taxation and Growth Rate Convergence: Tax Competition vs. Coordination

Optimal international taxation and its implications for convergence in long run income growth rates are analyzed in the context of an endogenously growing world economy with perfect capital mobility. Under tax competition (i) the residence principle will maximize national welfare; (ii) the optimal long run tax rate on capital incomes from various sources will be zero in all countries; and (iii) long term per capita income growth rates will be equalized across countries. Under tax coordination, (i) becomes irrelevant while (ii) and (iii) will continue to hold. In other words, optimal tax policies are growth-equalizing with and without international policy coordination. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Feasible implementation of taxation methods

This paper studies implementation of taxation methods in one-commodity environments in which the incomes of the agents are unknown to the planner. Feasibility out of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the environment. We present two mechanisms. The first one, which requires complete information, implements every taxation method in Nash, strong and coalition-proof equilibrium. The second, where informational requirements are relaxed, implements a large class of consistent and monotone methods in subgame perfect equilibrium. Neither mechanism employs the off-equilibrium devices used by the general theory. Under fully private information no method is implementable. Received: 12 March 1997 / Accepted: 21 July 1998